From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

On 10/2/2026 6:03 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 10/02/2026 10:48 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 10/02/2026 09:01 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:

Ross Finlayson <[email protected]> wrote:

On 10/01/2026 10:17 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:

[ Followup-To: set ]

In comp.theory Ross Finlayson <[email protected]> wrote:

On 10/01/2026 08:03 AM, Johann 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson wrote:

On 10/1/2026 10:17 PM, olcott wrote:

Most philosophers take Quine ideas to be an established
verified fact, thus shutting off making
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable before it has a chance to begin.

How do you define /most philosophers/?

The "philocasuy" or "philocasuistry" is a stronger, more technical >>>>>> account than "philosophistry", that the philocasuy is naturally
logical,
then that some philosophers have most philosophers are
not philosophers.

It's not dissimilar the "un-scientific", for example like where
Dark Matter/Energy long ago saw falsified many "standard" accounts, >>>>>> which are mostly cases of reductionism calling itself complete,
which is wrong.

"Great minds think alike" is a usual idea,
yet eventually there's "the great mind thinks".

Reading Quine, Quine acknowledges the "ultimate classes",
outside the ordinary theory, and "ur-elements" or "atoms",
outside the ordinary theory, and makes accounts of "modal
relativism", outside the ordinary theory, and as for a
"cosmic complement", outside the ordinary theory, and
deconstructive accounts of descriptive number theory,
outside the ordinary theory, then that as with regards
to "established verified fact": most philosophers
haven't actually read Quine, and have the perspective
of life in a wet, cardboard box, which some insist
can't be shred.

PA, Peano Arithmetic, is ordinary, yet, one can always
build the extra-ordinary in it, like Mirmanoff, or
Russell, before Russell's retro-thesis lied its way
to "an ordinary inductive set".

Yes, that's all very well, but how do you define "most philosophers", >>>>> like the previous poster challenged his predecessor to do?

That's a big "if".

"Common-sensical" is by definition a sort of reflection on
the inter-subjective and all the accounts of _reason_.

As "reflection on reason", and "structured reflection on
reason", then philosophy in a sense is about thinking beings
and feeling beings about human condition where man is animal
and man is machine, yet, man is mind, which is somehow sublime,
where for example it's an opinion that there's not a mind/body
problem, instead that a sort of holistic dual monism makes
for an account of paradox-free reason for theory primarily.

Then, sometimes "philosopher" is inclusive, and means any
thinking-being engaging in first-class reason, and sometimes
it's exclusive, meaning we're only yet attaining to be
"true philosophers", about what's "Truth" vis-a-vis
what's "true".

The notion of "philocasuy" then at least is a form of philosophy
that's yet rather more demanding its fulfillment.

Then, we might separate the "technical philosophy" from the
"analytical philosophy", or the "technical" from the "techno-analytic", >>>> that any usual common-sensical abstraction is well enough "analytic"
or "techno-analytic", yet, in terms of a theory overall and an
overall theory to be "technical", to be subjectable to technique,
that "most philosophers" these days would consider themselves in
their "paleo-classical, post-modern" approach to be analytical,
that logic and mathematics makes quite strong requirements what's
to be properly "technical".

Then, "moral philosophy" is its own sort of account about the
human condition, basically reflecting on free-will I haven't
much spoken to it, while I maintain notions of "absolute"
ethics and morals as for and above one-self.

Nobody's perfect, ..., "Truth" is, though.

Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha!

You really don't like giving straight answers to simple direct
questions,
do you?

What, ....

Alright then, "most" philosophers is a simple majority,
every thinking being has their own philosophy (and psychology),
_common sense_ is the usual account of agreement,
and that's what they think.

This is common-sense in the usual account of wisdom,
vis-a-vis, say, Tom Paine's pamphlets.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Sense



Perhaps, you might give your own definition,
what are your own answers to your own questions?

How about "extreme rationalism" since "structural realism",
and then for "Foundations" and something like a "theatheory"
as a putative candidate for a Foundations a theory-of-everything,
in the technical sense for a constant, consistent, complete,
and concrete account of a paleo-classical post-modern treatment
of reason on Truth?

Reflections on reason?

That for a "technical philosophy", then,
can we ever take the "mean" out of the "meaning"?

I too am very interested in foundations.

Instead of seeing all of the existing views I reverse
engineer the most coherent view from first principles.

"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language" (TOTBOMEIL)
turns out to only be relations between finite strings.

Some of them are stipulated relations and the rest
are semantic entailment specified syntactically.
--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of general knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
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