From Newsgroup: comp.theory

much discussion in this group has been had around the lair's paradox:

LP = "this sentence is false"

but not a lot of discussion has been in regards to the converse, the truth-teller's paradox:

TP = "this sentence is true"

now on the surface it might be trivially obvious that TP is a truth:
because if TP is a truth then well the sentence structure reinforces
that truth.

but consider setting TP as a falsity? well then the sentence structure
"this sentence is true" reinforces that falsity as well.

so which is it actually? can a sentence be both true and false at the
same time??

but the deeper question is: can this structure be expressed in the
formal system that godel utilized for his incompleteness proof? cause
that would be some shit, no?
--
arising us out of the computing dark ages,
please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
~ the lil crank that could

--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/9/2026 12:05 PM, dart200 wrote:

much discussion in this group has been had around the lair's paradox:

LP = "this sentence is false"

but not a lot of discussion has been in regards to the converse, the truth-teller's paradox:

TP = "this sentence is true"

now on the surface it might be trivially obvious that TP is a truth:
because if TP is a truth then well the sentence structure reinforces
that truth.

but consider setting TP as a falsity? well then the sentence structure
"this sentence is true" reinforces that falsity as well.

so which is it actually? can a sentence be both true and false at the
same time??

but the deeper question is: can this structure be expressed in the
formal system that godel utilized for his incompleteness proof? cause
that would be some shit, no?

% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.

% This sentence is true.
?- TT = true(TT).
TT = true(TT).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(TT, true(TT)).
false.

That people ignore my proof never has been any rebuttal.
--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 06/09/2026 10:05 AM, dart200 wrote:

much discussion in this group has been had around the lair's paradox:

LP = "this sentence is false"

but not a lot of discussion has been in regards to the converse, the truth-teller's paradox:

TP = "this sentence is true"

now on the surface it might be trivially obvious that TP is a truth:
because if TP is a truth then well the sentence structure reinforces
that truth.

but consider setting TP as a falsity? well then the sentence structure
"this sentence is true" reinforces that falsity as well.

so which is it actually? can a sentence be both true and false at the
same time??

but the deeper question is: can this structure be expressed in the
formal system that godel utilized for his incompleteness proof? cause
that would be some shit, no?

Since antiquity, such accounts invoke the "riddle of induction" or
"fallacy of induction", about limits of empirical and inductive reason, according to accounts of language.

Not otherwise saying anything, it's not false.


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From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/9/2026 1:20 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/09/2026 10:05 AM, dart200 wrote:

much discussion in this group has been had around the lair's paradox:

LP = "this sentence is false"

but not a lot of discussion has been in regards to the converse, the
truth-teller's paradox:

TP = "this sentence is true"

now on the surface it might be trivially obvious that TP is a truth:
because if TP is a truth then well the sentence structure reinforces
that truth.

but consider setting TP as a falsity? well then the sentence structure
"this sentence is true" reinforces that falsity as well.

so which is it actually? can a sentence be both true and false at the
same time??

but the deeper question is: can this structure be expressed in the
formal system that godel utilized for his incompleteness proof? cause
that would be some shit, no?

Since antiquity, such accounts invoke the "riddle of induction" or
"fallacy of induction", about limits of empirical and inductive reason, according to accounts of language.

Not otherwise saying anything, it's not false.

Not in this case. This case the evaluation of
the truth value of an expression gets stuck in
non-terminating recursion. This notion is best
understood within Proof Theoretic Semantics.
--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/9/2026 2:16 PM, Moebius wrote:

Am 09.06.2026 um 19:05 schrieb dart200:

much discussion in this group has been had around the lair's paradox:

LP = "this sentence is false"

but not a lot of discussion has been in regards to the converse, the
truth-teller's paradox:

TP = "this sentence is true"

now on the surface it might be trivially obvious that TP is a truth:
because if TP is a truth then well the sentence structure reinforces
that truth.

but consider setting TP as a falsity? well then the sentence structure
"this sentence is true" reinforces that falsity as well.

so which is it actually? can a sentence be both true and false at the
same time?

In a parconsistent logic it can. But if we stick to classical logic TP
seems to have troubles concerning its "truth value". TP is true if TP is true and TP is false if TP is false, doesn't help that much, imho.

But Taskis approach concerning LP should also work for TP.

Google-KI:

Source 1: Alfred Tarski solved the Liar Paradox by prohibiting languages from containing their own truth predicate, classifying this as "semantic closure". He introduced a strict hierarchy where the truth of a language
can only be evaluated by a meta-language, completely preventing the paradoxical self-reference.

Source 2: Tarski diagnosed the root of the Liar Paradox (e.g., "This statement is false") as the ability of a language to express its own
truth or falsehood.

Instead of an infinite hierarchy we only need the unlimited
orders of logic that type theory provides. This simple
type theory can be specified in a single language.

but the deeper question is: can this structure be expressed in the
formal system that godel utilized for his incompleteness proof? cause
that would be some shit, no?

KI:

"The famous Gödel sentence is a mathematical statement that roughly translates to: "This sentence is not provable within the given logical system"."

In the same way I guess there might be a sentence that roughly
translates to: "This sentence is provable within the given logical
system"."

Now if it actually IS provable the sentence is true. If it's NOT
provable the sentence would be false. In any case "no problem" I guess.

When Proof Theoretic Semantics is the foundation
then when G is not provable in PA then G simply
lacks semantic meaning in PA because in PTS meaning
is only derived by inferences and the rules of inference.

Proof-theoretic semantics is inherently inferential, as it is
inferential activity which manifests itself in proofs. It thus belongs
to inferentialism (a term coined by Brandom, see his 1994; 2000)
according to which inferences and the rules of inference establish the
meaning of expressions Schroeder-Heister, Peter, 2024 "Proof-Theoretic Semantics"

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/#InfeIntuAntiReal --
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/9/2026 3:34 PM, Moebius wrote:

Am 09.06.2026 um 21:16 schrieb Moebius:

Am 09.06.2026 um 19:05 schrieb dart200:

much discussion in this group has been had around the lair's paradox:

LP = "this sentence is false"

but not a lot of discussion has been in regards to the converse, the
truth-teller's paradox:

TP = "this sentence is true"

now on the surface it might be trivially obvious that TP is a truth:
because if TP is a truth then well the sentence structure reinforces
that truth.

but consider setting TP as a falsity? well then the sentence
structure "this sentence is true" reinforces that falsity as well.

so which is it actually? can a sentence be both true and false at the
same time?

In a parconsistent logic it can. But if we stick to classical logic TP
seems to have troubles concerning its "truth value". TP is true if TP
is true and TP is false if TP is false, doesn't help that much, imho.

Btw. We may have the same "state of affairs" concerning the "Russell paradox".

And we can directly see that RP is incoherent because
it involves a thing that is isomorphic to a can of
soup that so totally contains itself that it has no
outside surface. ZFC is the conventional way to toss
RP out on its ass.
--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/9/26 11:20 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/09/2026 10:05 AM, dart200 wrote:

much discussion in this group has been had around the lair's paradox:

LP = "this sentence is false"

but not a lot of discussion has been in regards to the converse, the
truth-teller's paradox:

TP = "this sentence is true"

now on the surface it might be trivially obvious that TP is a truth:
because if TP is a truth then well the sentence structure reinforces
that truth.

but consider setting TP as a falsity? well then the sentence structure
"this sentence is true" reinforces that falsity as well.

so which is it actually? can a sentence be both true and false at the
same time??

but the deeper question is: can this structure be expressed in the
formal system that godel utilized for his incompleteness proof? cause
that would be some shit, no?

Since antiquity, such accounts invoke the "riddle of induction" or
"fallacy of induction", about limits of empirical and inductive reason, according to accounts of language.

Not otherwise saying anything, it's not false.

hmmm, but if say expressible in a formal system like godel's, wouldn't
that imply true = false and therefore trigger the principle of
explosion? surely that would represent some kind of fallacy in the
axioms used to define said system, no?
--
arising us out of the computing dark ages,
please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
~ the lil crank that could
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 06/09/2026 05:34 PM, dart200 wrote:

On 6/9/26 11:20 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/09/2026 10:05 AM, dart200 wrote:

much discussion in this group has been had around the lair's paradox:

LP = "this sentence is false"

but not a lot of discussion has been in regards to the converse, the
truth-teller's paradox:

TP = "this sentence is true"

now on the surface it might be trivially obvious that TP is a truth:
because if TP is a truth then well the sentence structure reinforces
that truth.

but consider setting TP as a falsity? well then the sentence structure
"this sentence is true" reinforces that falsity as well.

so which is it actually? can a sentence be both true and false at the
same time??

but the deeper question is: can this structure be expressed in the
formal system that godel utilized for his incompleteness proof? cause
that would be some shit, no?

Since antiquity, such accounts invoke the "riddle of induction" or
"fallacy of induction", about limits of empirical and inductive reason,
according to accounts of language.

Not otherwise saying anything, it's not false.

hmmm, but if say expressible in a formal system like godel's, wouldn't
that imply true = false and therefore trigger the principle of
explosion? surely that would represent some kind of fallacy in the
axioms used to define said system, no?

https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson

This sentence is true, ....


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From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 06/10/2026 07:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/09/2026 05:34 PM, dart200 wrote:

On 6/9/26 11:20 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/09/2026 10:05 AM, dart200 wrote:

much discussion in this group has been had around the lair's paradox:

LP = "this sentence is false"

but not a lot of discussion has been in regards to the converse, the
truth-teller's paradox:

TP = "this sentence is true"

now on the surface it might be trivially obvious that TP is a truth:
because if TP is a truth then well the sentence structure reinforces
that truth.

but consider setting TP as a falsity? well then the sentence structure >>>> "this sentence is true" reinforces that falsity as well.

so which is it actually? can a sentence be both true and false at the
same time??

but the deeper question is: can this structure be expressed in the
formal system that godel utilized for his incompleteness proof? cause
that would be some shit, no?

Since antiquity, such accounts invoke the "riddle of induction" or
"fallacy of induction", about limits of empirical and inductive reason,
according to accounts of language.

Not otherwise saying anything, it's not false.

hmmm, but if say expressible in a formal system like godel's, wouldn't
that imply true = false and therefore trigger the principle of
explosion? surely that would represent some kind of fallacy in the
axioms used to define said system, no?

https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson

This sentence is true, ....

"Moment and Motion: logic and truth"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rqkJNg1a3mY


Imagine a rather long sentence.

This is a sentence, ..., this sentence is true,
this is a sentence, ..., this sentence is true,
this is a sentence, ..., this sentence is true,
this is a sentence, ..., this sentence is true,
this is a sentence, ..., this sentence is true,
...


Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse
and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",
or sometimes "eternal basic text", as Quine puts it.

Then, quantifying over all those statements,
makes that only one of the statements,
is: "the sentence is false".

The idea is that there's only one of those "Confessing Liars"
and thusly it makes for _implosion_ instead of _explosion_,
and "ex falso nihilum" instead of "ex falso quodlibet".


It also models any account of statements of a theory,
though it depends the interpretation of whether that's
true, about various uniform accounts of inference.


The mis-use of the vacuous is a great failing of
the modern classical quasi-model logic, which it is,
"quasi-modal".


Here there's a modern classical paleo-classical post-modern
account of modal temporal relevance logic, including first
class accounts of both the truth tables for bodies of relation,
and what accounts of the impredicative have for the resolution
of the paradoxes of induction, quantification, infinity, continuity,
identity, and so on.


There is a sentence: this sentence is true.



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From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse
and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.
--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 06/10/2026 08:33 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse
and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.

A "Comenius language" is an ideal, then there's
that a "Coleridge language" is the poesie.

So, it's figured that there's an ideal and perfect "Metonymy",
that is a real structure of all language,
and a practical and potential "Metaphor", which eventually fails,
so that Comenius & Coleridge for Metonymy & Metaphor,
are first-class sorts concepts in the dialectic.


So, the usual account of an "ontology" is that it's subject
to incompleteness, and also as about the inter-subjectivity
of the relay-able of the relate-able, while yet that the
objects of mathematics and logic have their own first-class
existence, so that "strong mathematical platonism" and
"weak logicist positivism" get put together to make
"strengthened logicist postivism".


One must always apply one's own deconstructive accounts
to one-self. Otherwise that's just hypcrisy again.


Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" has that Nietzsche
was _insane_ and said it didn't exist, then, in Nietzsche's
later years, sort of like Quixote, Nietzsche sobered or saned up,
and had again that a "true" eternal basic text was real, and true,
though by then most accounts of Nietzsche in the Nietzsche-Register
are neo-Nietzschean and fail to make for Nietzsche's greater
philosophical maturity.


The neo-anybody's are pretty much fake.

"F for fake" - Faith No More (Stripsearch)




--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/10/2026 11:15 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 08:33 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse
and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.

A "Comenius language" is an ideal, then there's
that a "Coleridge language" is the poesie.

So, it's figured that there's an ideal and perfect "Metonymy",
that is a real structure of all language,
and a practical and potential "Metaphor", which eventually fails,
so that Comenius & Coleridge for Metonymy & Metaphor,
are first-class sorts concepts in the dialectic.

So, the usual account of an "ontology" is that it's subject
to incompleteness, and also as about the inter-subjectivity
of the relay-able of the relate-able, while yet that the
objects of mathematics and logic have their own first-class
existence, so that "strong mathematical platonism" and
"weak logicist positivism" get put together to make
"strengthened logicist postivism".

One must always apply one's own deconstructive accounts
to one-self. Otherwise that's just hypcrisy again.

Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" has that Nietzsche
was _insane_ and said it didn't exist, then, in Nietzsche's
later years, sort of like Quixote, Nietzsche sobered or saned up,
and had again that a "true" eternal basic text was real, and true,
though by then most accounts of Nietzsche in the Nietzsche-Register
are neo-Nietzschean and fail to make for Nietzsche's greater
philosophical maturity.

The neo-anybody's are pretty much fake.

"F for fake" - Faith No More (Stripsearch)

So the body of knowledge expressed in language is entirely
comprised of:

(a) Expressions that are stipulated to be true
thus assigning semantic meaning to otherwise meaningless
finite strings and

(b) Expressions that are semantically entailed by (a)
and/or (b).

Because the foundational basis for expressions of language
is finite strings of symbols this semantic entailment must
be specified syntactically and processed as finite string
transformation rules.
--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 06/10/2026 09:27 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 11:15 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 08:33 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse
and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.

A "Comenius language" is an ideal, then there's
that a "Coleridge language" is the poesie.

So, it's figured that there's an ideal and perfect "Metonymy",
that is a real structure of all language,
and a practical and potential "Metaphor", which eventually fails,
so that Comenius & Coleridge for Metonymy & Metaphor,
are first-class sorts concepts in the dialectic.


So, the usual account of an "ontology" is that it's subject
to incompleteness, and also as about the inter-subjectivity
of the relay-able of the relate-able, while yet that the
objects of mathematics and logic have their own first-class
existence, so that "strong mathematical platonism" and
"weak logicist positivism" get put together to make
"strengthened logicist postivism".


One must always apply one's own deconstructive accounts
to one-self. Otherwise that's just hypcrisy again.


Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" has that Nietzsche
was _insane_ and said it didn't exist, then, in Nietzsche's
later years, sort of like Quixote, Nietzsche sobered or saned up,
and had again that a "true" eternal basic text was real, and true,
though by then most accounts of Nietzsche in the Nietzsche-Register
are neo-Nietzschean and fail to make for Nietzsche's greater
philosophical maturity.


The neo-anybody's are pretty much fake.

"F for fake" - Faith No More (Stripsearch)

So the body of knowledge expressed in language is entirely
comprised of:

(a) Expressions that are stipulated to be true
thus assigning semantic meaning to otherwise meaningless
finite strings and

(b) Expressions that are semantically entailed by (a)
and/or (b).

Because the foundational basis for expressions of language
is finite strings of symbols this semantic entailment must
be specified syntactically and processed as finite string
transformation rules.

Nope, that's just a positivism.




Everybody had heard the song "Epic", with its iconic
motif "What: is it?", then with regards to something
like Mini Maggit, or Passenger, about Distintegration
or Fascination Street vis-a-vis Icing Sugar and Like
Cockatoos, or for Falling to Pieces or Love Hate Love.


That's "a" body of knowledge, not "the" body of knowledge.


Quit repeating yourself, it's irritating.


--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 06/10/2026 10:02 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 09:27 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 11:15 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 08:33 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse
and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.

A "Comenius language" is an ideal, then there's
that a "Coleridge language" is the poesie.

So, it's figured that there's an ideal and perfect "Metonymy",
that is a real structure of all language,
and a practical and potential "Metaphor", which eventually fails,
so that Comenius & Coleridge for Metonymy & Metaphor,
are first-class sorts concepts in the dialectic.


So, the usual account of an "ontology" is that it's subject
to incompleteness, and also as about the inter-subjectivity
of the relay-able of the relate-able, while yet that the
objects of mathematics and logic have their own first-class
existence, so that "strong mathematical platonism" and
"weak logicist positivism" get put together to make
"strengthened logicist postivism".


One must always apply one's own deconstructive accounts
to one-self. Otherwise that's just hypcrisy again.


Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" has that Nietzsche
was _insane_ and said it didn't exist, then, in Nietzsche's
later years, sort of like Quixote, Nietzsche sobered or saned up,
and had again that a "true" eternal basic text was real, and true,
though by then most accounts of Nietzsche in the Nietzsche-Register
are neo-Nietzschean and fail to make for Nietzsche's greater
philosophical maturity.


The neo-anybody's are pretty much fake.

"F for fake" - Faith No More (Stripsearch)

So the body of knowledge expressed in language is entirely
comprised of:

(a) Expressions that are stipulated to be true
thus assigning semantic meaning to otherwise meaningless
finite strings and

(b) Expressions that are semantically entailed by (a)
and/or (b).

Because the foundational basis for expressions of language
is finite strings of symbols this semantic entailment must
be specified syntactically and processed as finite string
transformation rules.

Nope, that's just a positivism.

Everybody had heard the song "Epic", with its iconic
motif "What: is it?", then with regards to something
like Mini Maggit, or Passenger, about Distintegration
or Fascination Street vis-a-vis Icing Sugar and Like
Cockatoos, or for Falling to Pieces or Love Hate Love.

That's "a" body of knowledge, not "the" body of knowledge.

Quit repeating yourself, it's irritating.

That's just a positivism about
terms that don't belong to it,
here there's a "holistic dual monism".


Applying one's own deconstructive account to one-self,
the "modal temporal relevance logic" of all the things
has infinity and continuity as primary, and so very _real_.


That's for a matter of mathematical and philosophical
maturity (and after a course of reason, defines _sanity_).

Paradox-free reason has all the paradoxes in it as examples.


--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/10/2026 12:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 09:27 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 11:15 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 08:33 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse
and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.

A "Comenius language" is an ideal, then there's
that a "Coleridge language" is the poesie.

So, it's figured that there's an ideal and perfect "Metonymy",
that is a real structure of all language,
and a practical and potential "Metaphor", which eventually fails,
so that Comenius & Coleridge for Metonymy & Metaphor,
are first-class sorts concepts in the dialectic.


So, the usual account of an "ontology" is that it's subject
to incompleteness, and also as about the inter-subjectivity
of the relay-able of the relate-able, while yet that the
objects of mathematics and logic have their own first-class
existence, so that "strong mathematical platonism" and
"weak logicist positivism" get put together to make
"strengthened logicist postivism".


One must always apply one's own deconstructive accounts
to one-self. Otherwise that's just hypcrisy again.


Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" has that Nietzsche
was _insane_ and said it didn't exist, then, in Nietzsche's
later years, sort of like Quixote, Nietzsche sobered or saned up,
and had again that a "true" eternal basic text was real, and true,
though by then most accounts of Nietzsche in the Nietzsche-Register
are neo-Nietzschean and fail to make for Nietzsche's greater
philosophical maturity.


The neo-anybody's are pretty much fake.

"F for fake" - Faith No More (Stripsearch)

So the body of knowledge expressed in language is entirely
comprised of:

(a) Expressions that are stipulated to be true
thus assigning semantic meaning to otherwise meaningless
finite strings and

(b) Expressions that are semantically entailed by (a)
and/or (b).

Because the foundational basis for expressions of language
is finite strings of symbols this semantic entailment must
be specified syntactically and processed as finite string
transformation rules.

Nope, that's just a positivism.

No one bothers to notice that a valid counter-example
cannot possibly exist.

How the Hell else do otherwise meaningless finite strings
acquire meaning?
--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 06/10/2026 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 12:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 09:27 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 11:15 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 08:33 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse
and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.

A "Comenius language" is an ideal, then there's
that a "Coleridge language" is the poesie.

So, it's figured that there's an ideal and perfect "Metonymy",
that is a real structure of all language,
and a practical and potential "Metaphor", which eventually fails,
so that Comenius & Coleridge for Metonymy & Metaphor,
are first-class sorts concepts in the dialectic.


So, the usual account of an "ontology" is that it's subject
to incompleteness, and also as about the inter-subjectivity
of the relay-able of the relate-able, while yet that the
objects of mathematics and logic have their own first-class
existence, so that "strong mathematical platonism" and
"weak logicist positivism" get put together to make
"strengthened logicist postivism".


One must always apply one's own deconstructive accounts
to one-self. Otherwise that's just hypcrisy again.


Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" has that Nietzsche
was _insane_ and said it didn't exist, then, in Nietzsche's
later years, sort of like Quixote, Nietzsche sobered or saned up,
and had again that a "true" eternal basic text was real, and true,
though by then most accounts of Nietzsche in the Nietzsche-Register
are neo-Nietzschean and fail to make for Nietzsche's greater
philosophical maturity.


The neo-anybody's are pretty much fake.

"F for fake" - Faith No More (Stripsearch)

So the body of knowledge expressed in language is entirely
comprised of:

(a) Expressions that are stipulated to be true
thus assigning semantic meaning to otherwise meaningless
finite strings and

(b) Expressions that are semantically entailed by (a)
and/or (b).

Because the foundational basis for expressions of language
is finite strings of symbols this semantic entailment must
be specified syntactically and processed as finite string
transformation rules.

Nope, that's just a positivism.

No one bothers to notice that a valid counter-example
cannot possibly exist.

How the Hell else do otherwise meaningless finite strings
acquire meaning?

Well, you see, there are differences.

Obviously two distinct objects at all makes a counter-example
to there not being two distinct objects at all.

It's the classical dialectic since Parmenides, dual monism
after Heraclitus and a holistic dual monism and dialectic,
that it's the very point of difference at all that two objects
have their own theories and together make one theory of two
theories, then naturally all the reasoning about factuals
and counter-factuals arises since platonistically it already
exists.

It's a sad case being so sure about what guarantees itself
un-sure, then it's worse to be wrong about it, then whether
it's more pathetic to be a liar or ignorant, has usually
that it's worse to be a liar than ignorant.

Since then one could get blamed for malevolence instead of stupidity.


--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 06/10/2026 11:02 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 12:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 09:27 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 11:15 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 08:33 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse
and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.

A "Comenius language" is an ideal, then there's
that a "Coleridge language" is the poesie.

So, it's figured that there's an ideal and perfect "Metonymy",
that is a real structure of all language,
and a practical and potential "Metaphor", which eventually fails,
so that Comenius & Coleridge for Metonymy & Metaphor,
are first-class sorts concepts in the dialectic.


So, the usual account of an "ontology" is that it's subject
to incompleteness, and also as about the inter-subjectivity
of the relay-able of the relate-able, while yet that the
objects of mathematics and logic have their own first-class
existence, so that "strong mathematical platonism" and
"weak logicist positivism" get put together to make
"strengthened logicist postivism".


One must always apply one's own deconstructive accounts
to one-self. Otherwise that's just hypcrisy again.


Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" has that Nietzsche
was _insane_ and said it didn't exist, then, in Nietzsche's
later years, sort of like Quixote, Nietzsche sobered or saned up,
and had again that a "true" eternal basic text was real, and true,
though by then most accounts of Nietzsche in the Nietzsche-Register
are neo-Nietzschean and fail to make for Nietzsche's greater
philosophical maturity.


The neo-anybody's are pretty much fake.

"F for fake" - Faith No More (Stripsearch)

So the body of knowledge expressed in language is entirely
comprised of:

(a) Expressions that are stipulated to be true
thus assigning semantic meaning to otherwise meaningless
finite strings and

(b) Expressions that are semantically entailed by (a)
and/or (b).

Because the foundational basis for expressions of language
is finite strings of symbols this semantic entailment must
be specified syntactically and processed as finite string
transformation rules.

Nope, that's just a positivism.

No one bothers to notice that a valid counter-example
cannot possibly exist.

How the Hell else do otherwise meaningless finite strings
acquire meaning?

Well, you see, there are differences.

Obviously two distinct objects at all makes a counter-example
to there not being two distinct objects at all.

It's the classical dialectic since Parmenides, dual monism
after Heraclitus and a holistic dual monism and dialectic,
that it's the very point of difference at all that two objects
have their own theories and together make one theory of two
theories, then naturally all the reasoning about factuals
and counter-factuals arises since platonistically it already
exists.

It's a sad case being so sure about what guarantees itself
un-sure, then it's worse to be wrong about it, then whether
it's more pathetic to be a liar or ignorant, has usually
that it's worse to be a liar than ignorant.

Since then one could get blamed for malevolence instead of stupidity.

"The Logos" is a usual account, involving reason, rationality,
logic, discourse, language, and so on.


The post-modern criticism has a very welcome account of always
being able to offer a deconstructivist account of views, then
though that applying its own critique to itself, then demands
that all the paradoxes get made examples of themselves in an
overall theory that must acknowledge and resolve all the paradoxes
to result paradox-free reason itself, then for bringing back together
the idealistic and analytical traditions and for the teleology and
the ontology and for strong mathematical platonism and strong logicist positivism, and knowledge wisdom science intelligence, about the paleo-classical post-modernism that belongs to structural realism.

What you got there is a merely-partial half-account,
along with a howler fallacy of living in a box, or "Burse's box",
who is a troll.


--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/10/2026 1:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 12:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 09:27 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 11:15 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 08:33 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse
and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.

A "Comenius language" is an ideal, then there's
that a "Coleridge language" is the poesie.

So, it's figured that there's an ideal and perfect "Metonymy",
that is a real structure of all language,
and a practical and potential "Metaphor", which eventually fails,
so that Comenius & Coleridge for Metonymy & Metaphor,
are first-class sorts concepts in the dialectic.


So, the usual account of an "ontology" is that it's subject
to incompleteness, and also as about the inter-subjectivity
of the relay-able of the relate-able, while yet that the
objects of mathematics and logic have their own first-class
existence, so that "strong mathematical platonism" and
"weak logicist positivism" get put together to make
"strengthened logicist postivism".


One must always apply one's own deconstructive accounts
to one-self. Otherwise that's just hypcrisy again.


Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" has that Nietzsche
was _insane_ and said it didn't exist, then, in Nietzsche's
later years, sort of like Quixote, Nietzsche sobered or saned up,
and had again that a "true" eternal basic text was real, and true,
though by then most accounts of Nietzsche in the Nietzsche-Register
are neo-Nietzschean and fail to make for Nietzsche's greater
philosophical maturity.


The neo-anybody's are pretty much fake.

"F for fake" - Faith No More (Stripsearch)

So the body of knowledge expressed in language is entirely
comprised of:

(a) Expressions that are stipulated to be true
thus assigning semantic meaning to otherwise meaningless
finite strings and

(b) Expressions that are semantically entailed by (a)
and/or (b).

Because the foundational basis for expressions of language
is finite strings of symbols this semantic entailment must
be specified syntactically and processed as finite string
transformation rules.

Nope, that's just a positivism.

No one bothers to notice that a valid counter-example
cannot possibly exist.

How the Hell else do otherwise meaningless finite strings
acquire meaning?

Well, you see, there are differences.

Obviously two distinct objects at all makes a counter-example
to there not being two distinct objects at all.

It's the classical dialectic since Parmenides, dual monism
after Heraclitus and a holistic dual monism and dialectic,
that it's the very point of difference at all that two objects
have their own theories and together make one theory of two
theories, then naturally all the reasoning about factuals
and counter-factuals arises since platonistically it already
exists.

Exactly how do we say: "cats are animals"
without any stipulated relationship between those
(or equivalent) finite strings?
--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/10/2026 10:02 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 09:27 AM, olcott wrote:

[...]

Quit repeating yourself, it's irritating.

Remember... you are talking to somebody who thinks they are God.


--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/10/26 8:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 07:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/09/2026 05:34 PM, dart200 wrote:

On 6/9/26 11:20 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/09/2026 10:05 AM, dart200 wrote:

much discussion in this group has been had around the lair's paradox: >>>>>
LP = "this sentence is false"

but not a lot of discussion has been in regards to the converse, the >>>>> truth-teller's paradox:

TP = "this sentence is true"

now on the surface it might be trivially obvious that TP is a truth: >>>>> because if TP is a truth then well the sentence structure reinforces >>>>> that truth.

but consider setting TP as a falsity? well then the sentence structure >>>>> "this sentence is true" reinforces that falsity as well.

so which is it actually? can a sentence be both true and false at the >>>>> same time??

but the deeper question is: can this structure be expressed in the
formal system that godel utilized for his incompleteness proof? cause >>>>> that would be some shit, no?

Since antiquity, such accounts invoke the "riddle of induction" or
"fallacy of induction", about limits of empirical and inductive reason, >>>> according to accounts of language.

Not otherwise saying anything, it's not false.

hmmm, but if say expressible in a formal system like godel's, wouldn't
that imply true = false and therefore trigger the principle of
explosion? surely that would represent some kind of fallacy in the
axioms used to define said system, no?

https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson

This sentence is true, ....

"Moment and Motion:  logic and truth"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rqkJNg1a3mY

Imagine a rather long sentence.

This is a sentence, ..., this sentence is true,
this is a sentence, ..., this sentence is true,
this is a sentence, ..., this sentence is true,
this is a sentence, ..., this sentence is true,
this is a sentence, ..., this sentence is true,
...

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse
and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",
or sometimes "eternal basic text", as Quine puts it.

Then, quantifying over all those statements,
makes that only one of the statements,
is: "the sentence is false".

The idea is that there's only one of those "Confessing Liars"
and thusly it makes for _implosion_ instead of _explosion_,
and "ex falso nihilum" instead of "ex falso quodlibet".

It also models any account of statements of a theory,
though it depends the interpretation of whether that's
true, about various uniform accounts of inference.

The mis-use of the vacuous is a great failing of
the modern classical quasi-model logic, which it is,
"quasi-modal".

Here there's a modern classical paleo-classical post-modern
account of modal temporal relevance logic, including first
class accounts of both the truth tables for bodies of relation,
and what accounts of the impredicative have for the resolution
of the paradoxes of induction, quantification, infinity, continuity, identity, and so on.

There is a sentence: this sentence is true.

would u be so kind as to try to dial back the jargon a bit and
re-explain? i don't have a background in logic theory, i'm by profession
a software engineer

and while i do believe that teaches a _very_ robust conception of
logical processes, it doesn't teach associated jargon if those even exist

when i tried running ur post thru a gpt for just like brainstorming on
what i meants i got critique like this:

| The phrase "modern classical paleo-classical post-modern account"
| is a classic piece of Usenet stylistic overkill. In mainstream
| academia, those words flatly contradict each other (you can't
| really be "paleo-classical" and "post-modern" at the same time).
| In this context, though, the author is essentially signaling:
| "This framework is so foundational it's ancient, yet so advanced
| it transcends everything that came after it."

which is prolly bullshit too, but what i even know?
--
arising us out of the computing dark ages,
please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,
~ the lil crank that could
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 2026-06-09, dart200 <[email protected]d> wrote:

[...]

so which is it actually?

I wonder if it can be turned into a question of practical reason.
For example, if a 5-year-old girl looked up to me and said, "This
statement is true," I wouldn't want to bark down in her face that
she was wrong.

Yet there may be other practical bases on which one could still
make the case that it is false or meaningless.

-- Scott Hoge
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/10/2026 8:14 PM, Scott Hoge wrote:

On 2026-06-09, dart200 <[email protected]d> wrote:

[...]

so which is it actually?

I wonder if it can be turned into a question of practical reason.
For example, if a 5-year-old girl looked up to me and said, "This
statement is true," I wouldn't want to bark down in her face that
she was wrong.

Yet there may be other practical bases on which one could still
make the case that it is false or meaningless.

-- Scott Hoge

It is an aspect of making the body of knowledge
expressed in language computable.
--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 09/06/2026 18:05, dart200 wrote:

much discussion in this group has been had around the lair's paradox:

LP = "this sentence is false"

but not a lot of discussion has been in regards to the converse, the truth-teller's paradox:

TP = "this sentence is true"

now on the surface it might be trivially obvious that TP is a truth:
because if TP is a truth then well the sentence structure reinforces
that truth.

It is subject to axioms and inference steps.

The problem here is in the word "is".

Having truth ("is true", "is false") is a relation between a proposition
and the system it is being considered in.

So "is" does not have a definite meaning within a logical system.
Because we reason progressively (hence the utility of positive
intuitionism) we consider the truth of TP in many different systems, the meaning of "is" therefore varying as we think.

but the deeper question is: can this structure be expressed in the
formal system that godel utilized for his incompleteness proof? cause
that would be some shit, no?

No, his system has no object representing the system itself - hence some
of the criticisms of Goedel's work in comp.theory and on the web.
--
Tristan Wibberley

The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 09/06/2026 19:36, olcott wrote:

On 6/9/2026 1:20 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/09/2026 10:05 AM, dart200 wrote:

much discussion in this group has been had around the lair's paradox:

LP = "this sentence is false"

but not a lot of discussion has been in regards to the converse, the
truth-teller's paradox:

TP = "this sentence is true"

[snip]>> Not otherwise saying anything, it's not false.

Not in this case. This case the evaluation of
the truth value of an expression gets stuck in
non-terminating recursion. This notion is best
understood within Proof Theoretic Semantics.

Depending on your axioms and reasoning strategy. With TP itself as an
axiom it is indeed true or else the system is inconsistent.

Without TP as an axiom and with no inference of TP from the axioms but
with a positive intuitionist system and a theorem that there are no
statements with undefined truth then TP is false or else the system is inconsistent.
--
Tristan Wibberley

The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 09/06/2026 21:46, olcott wrote:

On 6/9/2026 3:34 PM, Moebius wrote:

...

Btw. We may have the same "state of affairs" concerning the "Russell
paradox".

And we can directly see that RP is incoherent ...

I note that Rp (too typographically and verbally similar to stay quiet)
refers to the replacement theorem in theoretical treatments of symbolic languages.
--
Tristan Wibberley

The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 11/06/2026 02:14, Scott Hoge wrote:

On 2026-06-09, dart200 <[email protected]d> wrote:

[...]

so which is it actually?

I wonder if it can be turned into a question of practical reason.
For example, if a 5-year-old girl looked up to me and said, "This
statement is true," I wouldn't want to bark down in her face that
she was wrong.

When did it become true and will it still be true when I think about it
later?
--
Tristan Wibberley

The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/11/2026 3:50 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

On 09/06/2026 19:36, olcott wrote:

On 6/9/2026 1:20 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/09/2026 10:05 AM, dart200 wrote:

much discussion in this group has been had around the lair's paradox:

LP = "this sentence is false"

but not a lot of discussion has been in regards to the converse, the
truth-teller's paradox:

TP = "this sentence is true"

[snip]>> Not otherwise saying anything, it's not false.

Not in this case. This case the evaluation of
the truth value of an expression gets stuck in
non-terminating recursion. This notion is best
understood within Proof Theoretic Semantics.

Depending on your axioms and reasoning strategy. With TP itself as an
axiom it is indeed true or else the system is inconsistent.

Welcome back you seems to be one of the most knowledgeable people here.

Boolean True(L, x) is a function on finite strings within
language L. Some of these finite string are axioms.

X := True(L, X) simply gets stuck in recursion.
a := b means a is defined as b and its processed
as macro replacement.

Same idea as this Prolog (if you know Prolog)
% This sentence is true.
?- TT = true(TT).
TT = true(TT).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(TT, true(TT)).
false.

Without TP as an axiom and with no inference of TP from the axioms but
with a positive intuitionist system and a theorem that there are no statements with undefined truth then TP is false or else the system is inconsistent.

It seems that you are saying that it is a sort of negation
as failure kind of false.
--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/11/2026 3:55 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

On 09/06/2026 21:46, olcott wrote:

On 6/9/2026 3:34 PM, Moebius wrote:

...

Btw. We may have the same "state of affairs" concerning the "Russell
paradox".

And we can directly see that RP is incoherent ...

I note that Rp (too typographically and verbally similar to stay quiet) refers to the replacement theorem in theoretical treatments of symbolic languages.

The removed context proved that I was talking about
Russell's Paradox. ZFC has already addressed this.

It is still important because several other instances
of pathological self-reference are still not recognized
as mere incoherence to be rejected.
--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 2026-06-11, Tristan Wibberley <[email protected]> wrote:

On 11/06/2026 02:14, Scott Hoge wrote:

I wonder if it can be turned into a question of practical
reason. For example, if a 5-year-old girl looked up to me and
said, "This statement is true," I wouldn't want to bark down
in her face that she was wrong.

When did it become true and will it still be true when I think
about it later?

It's all a language game. We're all making animal noises at each
other. One of those animal noises is the spoken word "true," and
another is the spoken word "false." As animals making noises, we
seek happiness. What we judge as "true" must cohere in a system
with what we use as a means to become happy.

That we formulate language games whose syntax and semantics agree
in concept with the rules and concepts governing the physical
world just goes to show how useful that was as a means to
happiness. "Truth" and "happiness" are defined circularly.

-- Scott Hoge
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 11/06/2026 23:11, olcott wrote:

It seems that you are saying that it is a sort of negation
as failure kind of false.

It depends on the logical system(s) that TP is a statement of, each
system might lead to a different characterisation for TP than the others.
--
Tristan Wibberley

The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/12/2026 7:32 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

On 11/06/2026 23:11, olcott wrote:

It seems that you are saying that it is a sort of negation
as failure kind of false.

It depends on the logical system(s) that TP is a statement of, each
system might lead to a different characterisation for TP than the others.

*Within Proof Theoretic Semantics*
Proof-theoretic semantics is inherently inferential,
as it is inferential activity which manifests itself
in proofs. It thus belongs to inferentialism (a term
coined by Brandom, see his 1994; 2000) according to
which inferences and the rules of inference establish
the meaning of expressions

Schroeder-Heister, Peter, 2024 "Proof-Theoretic Semantics" https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/#InfeIntuAntiReal --
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 12/06/2026 14:45, olcott wrote:

On 6/12/2026 7:32 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

On 11/06/2026 23:11, olcott wrote:

It seems that you are saying that it is a sort of negation
as failure kind of false.

It depends on the logical system(s) that TP is a statement of, each
system might lead to a different characterisation for TP than the others.

*Within Proof Theoretic Semantics*
  Proof-theoretic semantics is inherently inferential,
  as it is inferential activity which manifests itself
  in proofs. It thus belongs to inferentialism (a term
  coined by Brandom, see his 1994; 2000) according to
  which inferences and the rules of inference establish
  the meaning of expressions

Schroeder-Heister, Peter, 2024 "Proof-Theoretic Semantics" https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ #InfeIntuAntiReal

Per Curry and Feys, Proof Theoretic Semantics (henceforth in this
message: PTS), if you take it as a system is an episystem (I always
forget the right word, I should look it up when I have a organised
moment). PTS is applied to a selection form among other formalised
systems to yield a new system with theorems from both and some that are
newly derived therefrom.

So a discussion of the properties of systems applies when one uses PTS.
--
Tristan Wibberley

The message body is Copyright (C) 2026 Tristan Wibberley except
citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,
of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it
verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to
promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation
of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general
superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train
any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that
will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/12/2026 9:23 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

On 12/06/2026 14:45, olcott wrote:

On 6/12/2026 7:32 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:

On 11/06/2026 23:11, olcott wrote:

It seems that you are saying that it is a sort of negation
as failure kind of false.

It depends on the logical system(s) that TP is a statement of, each
system might lead to a different characterisation for TP than the others. >>>

*Within Proof Theoretic Semantics*
  Proof-theoretic semantics is inherently inferential,
  as it is inferential activity which manifests itself
  in proofs. It thus belongs to inferentialism (a term
  coined by Brandom, see his 1994; 2000) according to
  which inferences and the rules of inference establish
  the meaning of expressions

Schroeder-Heister, Peter, 2024 "Proof-Theoretic Semantics"
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
#InfeIntuAntiReal

Per Curry and Feys, Proof Theoretic Semantics (henceforth in this
message: PTS), if you take it as a system is an episystem (I always
forget the right word, I should look it up when I have a organised
moment). PTS is applied to a selection form among other formalised
systems to yield a new system with theorems from both and some that are
newly derived therefrom.

So a discussion of the properties of systems applies when one uses PTS.

Proof Theoretic Semantics it intended to override supersede
and utterly replace Truth Conditional Semantics (AKA model
theory) thus PA becomes only what its axioms actually specify.

Peter Schroeder-Heister coined the term: "Proof Theoretic Semantics"

"...inferences and the rules of inference establish the meaning of expressions"

I understand my above quote to be accurately paraphrased
to say that when G is unprovable in Peano Arithmetic then
G never derives any semantic meaning in PA.
--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 06/10/2026 11:34 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 1:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 12:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 09:27 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 11:15 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 08:33 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse
and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.

A "Comenius language" is an ideal, then there's
that a "Coleridge language" is the poesie.

So, it's figured that there's an ideal and perfect "Metonymy",
that is a real structure of all language,
and a practical and potential "Metaphor", which eventually fails,
so that Comenius & Coleridge for Metonymy & Metaphor,
are first-class sorts concepts in the dialectic.


So, the usual account of an "ontology" is that it's subject
to incompleteness, and also as about the inter-subjectivity
of the relay-able of the relate-able, while yet that the
objects of mathematics and logic have their own first-class
existence, so that "strong mathematical platonism" and
"weak logicist positivism" get put together to make
"strengthened logicist postivism".


One must always apply one's own deconstructive accounts
to one-self. Otherwise that's just hypcrisy again.


Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" has that Nietzsche
was _insane_ and said it didn't exist, then, in Nietzsche's
later years, sort of like Quixote, Nietzsche sobered or saned up,
and had again that a "true" eternal basic text was real, and true, >>>>>> though by then most accounts of Nietzsche in the Nietzsche-Register >>>>>> are neo-Nietzschean and fail to make for Nietzsche's greater
philosophical maturity.


The neo-anybody's are pretty much fake.

"F for fake" - Faith No More (Stripsearch)

So the body of knowledge expressed in language is entirely
comprised of:

(a) Expressions that are stipulated to be true
thus assigning semantic meaning to otherwise meaningless
finite strings and

(b) Expressions that are semantically entailed by (a)
and/or (b).

Because the foundational basis for expressions of language
is finite strings of symbols this semantic entailment must
be specified syntactically and processed as finite string
transformation rules.

Nope, that's just a positivism.

No one bothers to notice that a valid counter-example
cannot possibly exist.

How the Hell else do otherwise meaningless finite strings
acquire meaning?

Well, you see, there are differences.

Obviously two distinct objects at all makes a counter-example
to there not being two distinct objects at all.

It's the classical dialectic since Parmenides, dual monism
after Heraclitus and a holistic dual monism and dialectic,
that it's the very point of difference at all that two objects
have their own theories and together make one theory of two
theories, then naturally all the reasoning about factuals
and counter-factuals arises since platonistically it already
exists.

Exactly how do we say: "cats are animals"
without any stipulated relationship between those
(or equivalent) finite strings?

"Types" usually, accounts of relation.

Cladistics, phylogeny, morphology, ..., types.

Metaphor and simile often enough.

Relations, generally.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cladistics

"Cladistics is now the most commonly used method to classify organisms."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cladistics#In_disciplines_other_than_biology

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_theory


--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/12/2026 11:27 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 11:34 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 1:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 12:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 09:27 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 11:15 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 08:33 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse
and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.

A "Comenius language" is an ideal, then there's
that a "Coleridge language" is the poesie.

So, it's figured that there's an ideal and perfect "Metonymy",
that is a real structure of all language,
and a practical and potential "Metaphor", which eventually fails, >>>>>>> so that Comenius & Coleridge for Metonymy & Metaphor,
are first-class sorts concepts in the dialectic.


So, the usual account of an "ontology" is that it's subject
to incompleteness, and also as about the inter-subjectivity
of the relay-able of the relate-able, while yet that the
objects of mathematics and logic have their own first-class
existence, so that "strong mathematical platonism" and
"weak logicist positivism" get put together to make
"strengthened logicist postivism".


One must always apply one's own deconstructive accounts
to one-self. Otherwise that's just hypcrisy again.


Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" has that Nietzsche
was _insane_ and said it didn't exist, then, in Nietzsche's
later years, sort of like Quixote, Nietzsche sobered or saned up, >>>>>>> and had again that a "true" eternal basic text was real, and true, >>>>>>> though by then most accounts of Nietzsche in the Nietzsche-Register >>>>>>> are neo-Nietzschean and fail to make for Nietzsche's greater
philosophical maturity.


The neo-anybody's are pretty much fake.

"F for fake" - Faith No More (Stripsearch)

So the body of knowledge expressed in language is entirely
comprised of:

(a) Expressions that are stipulated to be true
thus assigning semantic meaning to otherwise meaningless
finite strings and

(b) Expressions that are semantically entailed by (a)
and/or (b).

Because the foundational basis for expressions of language
is finite strings of symbols this semantic entailment must
be specified syntactically and processed as finite string
transformation rules.

Nope, that's just a positivism.

No one bothers to notice that a valid counter-example
cannot possibly exist.

How the Hell else do otherwise meaningless finite strings
acquire meaning?

Well, you see, there are differences.

Obviously two distinct objects at all makes a counter-example
to there not being two distinct objects at all.

It's the classical dialectic since Parmenides, dual monism
after Heraclitus and a holistic dual monism and dialectic,
that it's the very point of difference at all that two objects
have their own theories and together make one theory of two
theories, then naturally all the reasoning about factuals
and counter-factuals arises since platonistically it already
exists.

Exactly how do we say: "cats are animals"
without any stipulated relationship between those
(or equivalent) finite strings?

"Types" usually, accounts of relation.

098b5d25-9aa2-45be-a279-f9d440cccf4f "cats" bef95c07-48b6-4067-99dd-dfe7c5f76aef "are a type of" ac7253bc-6686-4b42-b634-7ca55b3aef03 "animals"

Now where do get get the rest of the specific concrete meaning of 098b5d25-9aa2-45be-a279-f9d440cccf4f "cats" ?

Cladistics, phylogeny, morphology, ..., types.

Metaphor and simile often enough.

Relations, generally.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cladistics

"Cladistics is now the most commonly used method to classify organisms."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cladistics#In_disciplines_other_than_biology

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_theory

--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 06/12/2026 09:44 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/12/2026 11:27 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 11:34 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 1:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 12:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 09:27 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 11:15 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 08:33 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse >>>>>>>>>> and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.

A "Comenius language" is an ideal, then there's
that a "Coleridge language" is the poesie.

So, it's figured that there's an ideal and perfect "Metonymy", >>>>>>>> that is a real structure of all language,
and a practical and potential "Metaphor", which eventually fails, >>>>>>>> so that Comenius & Coleridge for Metonymy & Metaphor,
are first-class sorts concepts in the dialectic.


So, the usual account of an "ontology" is that it's subject
to incompleteness, and also as about the inter-subjectivity
of the relay-able of the relate-able, while yet that the
objects of mathematics and logic have their own first-class
existence, so that "strong mathematical platonism" and
"weak logicist positivism" get put together to make
"strengthened logicist postivism".


One must always apply one's own deconstructive accounts
to one-self. Otherwise that's just hypcrisy again.


Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" has that Nietzsche
was _insane_ and said it didn't exist, then, in Nietzsche's
later years, sort of like Quixote, Nietzsche sobered or saned up, >>>>>>>> and had again that a "true" eternal basic text was real, and true, >>>>>>>> though by then most accounts of Nietzsche in the Nietzsche-Register >>>>>>>> are neo-Nietzschean and fail to make for Nietzsche's greater
philosophical maturity.


The neo-anybody's are pretty much fake.

"F for fake" - Faith No More (Stripsearch)

So the body of knowledge expressed in language is entirely
comprised of:

(a) Expressions that are stipulated to be true
thus assigning semantic meaning to otherwise meaningless
finite strings and

(b) Expressions that are semantically entailed by (a)
and/or (b).

Because the foundational basis for expressions of language
is finite strings of symbols this semantic entailment must
be specified syntactically and processed as finite string
transformation rules.

Nope, that's just a positivism.

No one bothers to notice that a valid counter-example
cannot possibly exist.

How the Hell else do otherwise meaningless finite strings
acquire meaning?

Well, you see, there are differences.

Obviously two distinct objects at all makes a counter-example
to there not being two distinct objects at all.

It's the classical dialectic since Parmenides, dual monism
after Heraclitus and a holistic dual monism and dialectic,
that it's the very point of difference at all that two objects
have their own theories and together make one theory of two
theories, then naturally all the reasoning about factuals
and counter-factuals arises since platonistically it already
exists.

Exactly how do we say: "cats are animals"
without any stipulated relationship between those
(or equivalent) finite strings?

"Types" usually, accounts of relation.

098b5d25-9aa2-45be-a279-f9d440cccf4f "cats" bef95c07-48b6-4067-99dd-dfe7c5f76aef "are a type of" ac7253bc-6686-4b42-b634-7ca55b3aef03 "animals"

Now where do get get the rest of the specific concrete meaning of 098b5d25-9aa2-45be-a279-f9d440cccf4f "cats" ?

Cladistics, phylogeny, morphology, ..., types.

Metaphor and simile often enough.

Relations, generally.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cladistics

"Cladistics is now the most commonly used method to classify organisms."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cladistics#In_disciplines_other_than_biology >>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_theory

Don't you even have a grammar for language? Always?

Grammar and etymology? Those are words first, then words for things.

"Vector machines" aren't thinking, they're programs.

Obviously, modern accounts of mechanical reasoning are _reasoning_
agents, not "cats, following the red dot".

Then, while you're at it, define "oats".

(This is that robots are cats and thinkers are oats.)


That relations among objects are relations, as are theirs,
ad infinitum, shows that the language of objects is infinite.


--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 6/12/2026 2:27 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/12/2026 09:44 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/12/2026 11:27 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 11:34 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 1:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 12:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 09:27 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 11:15 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 08:33 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse >>>>>>>>>>> and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.

A "Comenius language" is an ideal, then there's
that a "Coleridge language" is the poesie.

So, it's figured that there's an ideal and perfect "Metonymy", >>>>>>>>> that is a real structure of all language,
and a practical and potential "Metaphor", which eventually fails, >>>>>>>>> so that Comenius & Coleridge for Metonymy & Metaphor,
are first-class sorts concepts in the dialectic.


So, the usual account of an "ontology" is that it's subject
to incompleteness, and also as about the inter-subjectivity
of the relay-able of the relate-able, while yet that the
objects of mathematics and logic have their own first-class
existence, so that "strong mathematical platonism" and
"weak logicist positivism" get put together to make
"strengthened logicist postivism".


One must always apply one's own deconstructive accounts
to one-self. Otherwise that's just hypcrisy again.


Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" has that Nietzsche
was _insane_ and said it didn't exist, then, in Nietzsche's
later years, sort of like Quixote, Nietzsche sobered or saned up, >>>>>>>>> and had again that a "true" eternal basic text was real, and true, >>>>>>>>> though by then most accounts of Nietzsche in the Nietzsche- >>>>>>>>> Register
are neo-Nietzschean and fail to make for Nietzsche's greater >>>>>>>>> philosophical maturity.


The neo-anybody's are pretty much fake.

"F for fake" - Faith No More (Stripsearch)

So the body of knowledge expressed in language is entirely
comprised of:

(a) Expressions that are stipulated to be true
thus assigning semantic meaning to otherwise meaningless
finite strings and

(b) Expressions that are semantically entailed by (a)
and/or (b).

Because the foundational basis for expressions of language
is finite strings of symbols this semantic entailment must
be specified syntactically and processed as finite string
transformation rules.

Nope, that's just a positivism.

No one bothers to notice that a valid counter-example
cannot possibly exist.

How the Hell else do otherwise meaningless finite strings
acquire meaning?

Well, you see, there are differences.

Obviously two distinct objects at all makes a counter-example
to there not being two distinct objects at all.

It's the classical dialectic since Parmenides, dual monism
after Heraclitus and a holistic dual monism and dialectic,
that it's the very point of difference at all that two objects
have their own theories and together make one theory of two
theories, then naturally all the reasoning about factuals
and counter-factuals arises since platonistically it already
exists.

Exactly how do we say: "cats are animals"
without any stipulated relationship between those
(or equivalent) finite strings?

"Types" usually, accounts of relation.

098b5d25-9aa2-45be-a279-f9d440cccf4f "cats"
bef95c07-48b6-4067-99dd-dfe7c5f76aef "are a type of"
ac7253bc-6686-4b42-b634-7ca55b3aef03 "animals"

Now where do get get the rest of the specific concrete meaning of
098b5d25-9aa2-45be-a279-f9d440cccf4f "cats" ?

Cladistics, phylogeny, morphology, ..., types.

Metaphor and simile often enough.

Relations, generally.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cladistics

"Cladistics is now the most commonly used method to classify organisms." >>>
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Cladistics#In_disciplines_other_than_biology


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_theory

Don't you even have a grammar for language? Always?

Grammar and etymology? Those are words first, then words for things.

CycL in computer science and artificial intelligence,
is an ontology language used by Douglas Lenat's Cyc
artificial intelligence project.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CycL
CycL of the Cyc Project is the grammar and Cyc itself as
the type hierarchy.

Cyc uses GUIDs for unique sense meanings of words.

"Vector machines" aren't thinking, they're programs.

Obviously, modern accounts of mechanical reasoning are _reasoning_
agents, not "cats, following the red dot".

Then, while you're at it, define "oats".

(This is that robots are cats and thinkers are oats.)

That relations among objects are relations, as are theirs,
ad infinitum, shows that the language of objects is infinite.

--
Copyright 2026 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
The complete structure of this system is now defined.

The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
(a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

(b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
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From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 06/12/2026 12:27 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/12/2026 09:44 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/12/2026 11:27 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 11:34 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 1:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 12:02 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 09:27 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 11:15 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 06/10/2026 08:33 AM, olcott wrote:

On 6/10/2026 10:08 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

Then an idea is that that's the entire domain of discourse >>>>>>>>>>> and it's one complete sentence
and it is what defines "true"
and it's called a "Comenius language",

Panglottia is an idea similar to mine.
Connecting together elements of the body of knowledge
such that every expression of language is necessarily
true. There is no such thing as false knowledge.

The Truth Teller lacks such a connection.

A "Comenius language" is an ideal, then there's
that a "Coleridge language" is the poesie.

So, it's figured that there's an ideal and perfect "Metonymy", >>>>>>>>> that is a real structure of all language,
and a practical and potential "Metaphor", which eventually fails, >>>>>>>>> so that Comenius & Coleridge for Metonymy & Metaphor,
are first-class sorts concepts in the dialectic.


So, the usual account of an "ontology" is that it's subject
to incompleteness, and also as about the inter-subjectivity
of the relay-able of the relate-able, while yet that the
objects of mathematics and logic have their own first-class
existence, so that "strong mathematical platonism" and
"weak logicist positivism" get put together to make
"strengthened logicist postivism".


One must always apply one's own deconstructive accounts
to one-self. Otherwise that's just hypcrisy again.


Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" has that Nietzsche
was _insane_ and said it didn't exist, then, in Nietzsche's
later years, sort of like Quixote, Nietzsche sobered or saned up, >>>>>>>>> and had again that a "true" eternal basic text was real, and true, >>>>>>>>> though by then most accounts of Nietzsche in the
Nietzsche-Register
are neo-Nietzschean and fail to make for Nietzsche's greater >>>>>>>>> philosophical maturity.


The neo-anybody's are pretty much fake.

"F for fake" - Faith No More (Stripsearch)

So the body of knowledge expressed in language is entirely
comprised of:

(a) Expressions that are stipulated to be true
thus assigning semantic meaning to otherwise meaningless
finite strings and

(b) Expressions that are semantically entailed by (a)
and/or (b).

Because the foundational basis for expressions of language
is finite strings of symbols this semantic entailment must
be specified syntactically and processed as finite string
transformation rules.

Nope, that's just a positivism.

No one bothers to notice that a valid counter-example
cannot possibly exist.

How the Hell else do otherwise meaningless finite strings
acquire meaning?

Well, you see, there are differences.

Obviously two distinct objects at all makes a counter-example
to there not being two distinct objects at all.

It's the classical dialectic since Parmenides, dual monism
after Heraclitus and a holistic dual monism and dialectic,
that it's the very point of difference at all that two objects
have their own theories and together make one theory of two
theories, then naturally all the reasoning about factuals
and counter-factuals arises since platonistically it already
exists.

Exactly how do we say: "cats are animals"
without any stipulated relationship between those
(or equivalent) finite strings?

"Types" usually, accounts of relation.

098b5d25-9aa2-45be-a279-f9d440cccf4f "cats"
bef95c07-48b6-4067-99dd-dfe7c5f76aef "are a type of"
ac7253bc-6686-4b42-b634-7ca55b3aef03 "animals"

Now where do get get the rest of the specific concrete meaning of
098b5d25-9aa2-45be-a279-f9d440cccf4f "cats" ?

Cladistics, phylogeny, morphology, ..., types.

Metaphor and simile often enough.

Relations, generally.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cladistics

"Cladistics is now the most commonly used method to classify organisms." >>>
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cladistics#In_disciplines_other_than_biology >>>


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_theory

Don't you even have a grammar for language? Always?

Grammar and etymology? Those are words first, then words for things.

"Vector machines" aren't thinking, they're programs.

Obviously, modern accounts of mechanical reasoning are _reasoning_
agents, not "cats, following the red dot".

Then, while you're at it, define "oats".

(This is that robots are cats and thinkers are oats.)

That relations among objects are relations, as are theirs,
ad infinitum, shows that the language of objects is infinite.

"Codes" or "codemes", if you've ever heard of Barthes for example,
have it that "GUID's" or "globally unique identifiers" are rather
opaque codes with regards to structured codes, like words are,
with word roots, and connections to the dictionariological.

Yeah, I guess you don't.


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